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I. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-3-
102(3)0). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the district court, interpreting Utah Code § 78B-6-501(6)(a), incorrectly 
reached the legal conclusion that this statutory grant of authority for the exercise of 
eminent domain to reach mineral deposits excludes oil and gas as non-mineral 
substances? 
III. STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
This case is a question of statutory interpretation, which is a question of law. See, 
e.g., Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, ^ 5, 162 P.3d 1099; Sachs v. Lesser, 2008 UT 87, f 9, 207 
P.3d 1215. Where the issue on appeal is purely legal in nature, this Court "review[s] the 
district court's decision for correctness, without deference." Conatser v. Johnson, 2008 
UT 48, % 10, 194 P.3d 897 (quotation omitted). 
IV. PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL 
A Notice of Appeal was timely filed with the Seventh Judicial District Court in 
and for Carbon County, State of Utah, on September 27, 2009. 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code § 78B-6-501(6)(a): Subject to the provisions of this part, the right of 
eminent domain may be exercised on behalf of the following public uses: (6)(a) roads, 
1 
railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, and dumping places to facilitate the 
milling, smelting, or other reduction of ores, or the working of mines, quarries, coal 
mines, or mineral deposits including minerals in solution. 
Utah Code § 78B-6-501(6)(d): Subject to the provisions of this part, the right of 
eminent domain may be exercised on behalf of the following public uses: (6)(d) gas, oil 
or coal pipelines, tanks or reservoirs, including any subsurface stratum or formation in 
any land for the underground storage of natural gas, and in connection with that, any 
other interests in property which may be required to adequately examine, prepare, 
maintain, and operate underground natural gas storage facilities. 
Utah Code § 53C~1-103(4): As used in this title: (4) "Mineral" includes oil, gas, 
and hydrocarbons. 
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VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State of Utah School and Institutional Trust Administration (the "Trust") 
owns oil and gas minerals deposited in lands bounded by real property owned and/or 
controlled by KFJ Ranch Partnership (the "Ranch"). Marion Energy, Inc. ("Marion") is 
the Trust's Lessee of the Trust's oil and gas deposits. (R.00003, % 10) 
Due to location and topography, Marion cannot access the leased premises without 
crossing Ranch-owned lands. In an effort to gain access to the leased oil and gas 
deposits, Marion unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate easements from the Ranch. 
Despite Marion's good-faith efforts, the Ranch refused to grant Marion any easements, 
and Marion continued to be without an access route to the leased oil and gas. (R.00006, 
117) 
Since it was impossible for Marion to reach the leased oil and gas deposits, or for 
the Trust to thereby receive royalties from the production of oil and gas thereon, the Trust 
and Marion brought an action for condemnation in the district court. The condemnation 
action was founded upon the express rights of eminent domain granted by the legislature 
and codified as Utah Code § 78B-6-501(6)(a) ("Section 501(6)(a)") and Utah Code 
§78B-6-503.(R.00007,lJ20) 
On its face, Section 501(6)(a) confers the power of eminent domain for the 
construction of "roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, and dumping 
places to facilitate the milling, smelting, or other reduction of ores, or the working of 
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mines, quarries, coal mines, or mineral deposits including minerals in solution." 
(Emphasis added.) (R.000126,f1) 
The Ranch moved to dismiss the Complaint in Condemnation. (R.000073) In 
response, Marion and the Trust not only opposed the Ranch's motion (R.000119), but 
also moved for partial summary judgment on the grounds that, as a matter of law, Utah 
Code § 78B-6-501, authorizes the power of eminent domain to access Plaintiffs' leases 
for the working of oil and gas mineral deposits. (R.000144, Tf 1) 
Given this procedural posture, the district court was faced with the sole question of 
whether the Trust's oil and gas deposits sought to be accessed by Marion fell within the 
scope of "mineral deposits including minerals in solution" as used in Section 501(6)(a). 
Following a hearing on the parties' motions, the district court incorrectly 
concluded that the legislature purposefully excluded "oil and gas" from Section 
501(6)(a). As a result, according to the district court, Marion and the Trust could not rely 
upon the eminent domain authority set forth therein to reach the oil and gas deposits 
owned by the Trust situated below real property owned by the Ranch. (R.000216, f 4) 
The district court's holding, as a matter of law, was incorrect and cannot be 
sustained. This Court consistently has held that the term "minerals" includes oil and gas, 
and that definition is supported by other authority, including the Trust's Enabling Act. 
See Utah Code § 53C-1-103(4). 
Application of the settled definition of "minerals" to an interpretation of Section 
501(6)(a) compels the conclusion that Marion and the Trust properly invoked the 
statutory authority of eminent domain to access the leased oil and gas deposits. The 
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district court erred by ignoring the unambiguous meaning of "minerals" and by 
impermissibly applying principles of statutory construction to an unambiguous statutory 
provision. Moreover, the district court's ruling would result in an absurd result that 
cannot be supported or affirmed. 
VII. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Marion is the lessee of oil and gas leases ML-48130 and ML-48132 (the 
"Leases"), which it leased from the Trust. Pursuant to the Leases, the Trust remains the 
reversionary interest owner. (R.00003, f 10) Both Leases are overlain by surface owned 
by or under permit to the Ranch. 
Specifically, Lease ML-48130 covers the following lands: 
Township 12 South. Range 12 East, SLB&M 
Section 21: NVSNE1/*, EVSNWVi, NVfcSE1/^  SEViSEtf 
Section 22: SEVSNEtt, N^NW^, SE^NW1/^ NEKSW1/* 
NEViSEVi 
Section 23: SWVJNE1/^  WASWA, SWVSNWtf 
Section 24: SEtfNEVi 
Section 25: EVSSWV* 
Section 26: NW^NWVi 
Section 27: NEViNEVi, NEVSNWVi 
Section 36: ALL 
(containing 1560.00 acres more or less in Carbon County, Utah) 
Lease ML-48132 covers the following lands: 
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Township 12 South. Range 13 East. SLB&M 
Section 19: Lot 10 (44.28 acres), SEVANE'A, W1/2SE1/4 
Section 20: S^NW'A NEttSWVi, SWttSWtt, NE^SE1/* 
Section 29: NWttNWVi, W&SWtt 
Section 30: Lot 1 (46.26 acres), E1/2NE1/4, SEVi 
Section 31: Lot 6 (32.47 acres), EVSNEVS, NEttSEtt 
Section 32: Lot 1 (33.40 acres), Lot 2 (33.18 acres), Lot 3 (33.13 
acres), Lot 4 (33.61 acres), NViS^, NV4 (ALL) 
(containing 1576.33 acres more or less in Carbon County, Utah) (R.00003-00004, f 10) 
To exploit the leased oil and gas deposits, Marion proposed two initial well 
locations (the "Well Sites") on surface lands covered by or within the Ranch. Marion's 
plans called for the KFJ #20-1 well to be located in the NEViSEtt of Section 20 in 
Township 12 South, Range 13 East, SLB&M on Lease ML-48132, in close proximity to 
the existing road leading from Nine Mile Canyon Road through Sections 17, 21 and 29, 
also known as the KFJ Ranch Road. (R.00005,111) 
Marion also proposed to locate the Pole Canyon West #36-1 well in the 
NW'/SNE1/* of Section 36, Township 12 South, Range 12 East, SLB&M on Lease ML-
48130. In an effort to minimize surface disturbances, this well was proposed to be 
located in close proximity to the existing road, known as the Pole Canyon Road, running 
south from Nine Mile Canyon Road through Sections 24 and 25 and into State Section 
36. (R.00005,112) 
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If the wells drilled on the Well Sites proved to be commercially productive, 
Marion intended to install pipelines connecting to the wells in or near these existing roads 
in efforts to further minimize surface damage to the KFJ Ranch. (R.00005, ^  13) 
Because of the topography and the location of the lands covered by the Leases, 
however, it was impossible for Marion to access the Leases without crossing surface 
lands owned and/or controlled by the Ranch. As a result, Marion engaged in substantive, 
good-faith efforts to negotiate easements (the "Easements") from the Ranch. (R.00006, 
117) 
Despite these efforts, however, the Ranch refused to enter into any agreement with 
Marion with respect to either the locations of or the compensation to be paid to the Ranch 
for Easements across the Ranch. (R.000130) 
Left without any means of accessing the Leases and the leased oil and gas 
deposits, Marion sought to avail itself of the legislatively enacted condemnation rights. 
Pursuant to Utah Code § 78B-6-505, Marion advised the Ranch of its rights to mediation 
and arbitration under Utah Code § 78B-6-522, provided the name and current telephone 
number of the office of the State of Utah Private Property Ombudsman, and gave the 
Ranch a written statement explaining that oral representations or promises made during 
the negotiation process were not binding upon Marion. (R.00006, f 18) 
Marion also retained J. Philip Cook, MAI, CRE, Utah State-Certified General 
Appraiser, Certificate 5451057-CGOO, of LECG, LLC, to appraise the property to be 
taken from the Ranch for use as the Easements (the "KFJ Appraisal"). In the KFJ 
Appraisal, Mr. Cook arrived at a total value for the Easements of $28,000, reflecting a 
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rounded valuation of the perpetual easement sought by Marion (valued at $24,868), in 
addition to the temporary construction easement also requested by Marion (valued at 
$3,040). The bases for the valuations were set forth in detail in the KFJ Appraisal. 
(R.00007,f 24,25) 
Because the Trust, as the reversionary interest owner of the Leases, desired to 
have Marion exploit the oil and gas deposits on the Leases and thereby pay the prescribed 
royalties to and for the benefit of the Trust, Marion and the Trust filed a Complaint in 
Condemnation (the "Complaint") in the Seventh Judicial District Court, in and for 
Carbon County (the "district court"). (R.00001-00009) 
After being served with the Complaint, the Ranch moved to dismiss the Complaint 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure asserting that the Trust 
and Marion did "not have the authority under the condemnation statute to take 
Defendant's private land for roads to access oil and gas leases." (R.00073, *f I) Marion 
and the Trust opposed the Ranch's Motion to Dismiss and also moved for partial 
summary judgment for a determination "that Utah Code § 78B-6-501 authorizes 
Plaintiffs to condemn an easement to access Trust oil and gas leases." (R.000144, f^ 1) 
Following a hearing on August 5, 2009, the district court issued a Judgment and 
Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment (the "Judgment"). In the Judgment, the district court held that 
Section 501(6)(a) "does not provide authority to take lands for roads to access oil and gas 
deposits." (R.000216,13) 
Marion and the Trust appealed the Judgment to this Court. (R.000219) 
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VIII. SI M l 1 ,In U \ I V U« i 11 IN IKN'I\S 
The district court incorrectly held that the legislature purposefully excluded oil 
the eminent domain authority set forth therein to reach the Trust's oil and gas deposits 
MJI italed below real property owned b> the Ranch. 
The district court's holding, as a matter of law, was incorrect and cannot be 
sustained. This Court consistently has held that the term, "minerals" includes oil and gas, 
expressed in the Trust's Enabling Act. I Jtah Code § 5301-103(4). 
Application of the settled definition of "minerals" to the construction u section 
501(6)(a) compels the conch ision that l\ larion and the Tri ist prop • . • . - - e 
statutory authority of eminent domain to access the leased oil and gas deposits. The 
impermissibly applying principles of statutory construction to an unambiguous statutory 
provision. Moreover, the district court.'s .ruling would result in an absurd result that 
incorrect and cannot be sustained. 
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DL ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED UTAH CODE 
SECTION 501(6)(a) BY CONCLUDING THAT THE STATUTORY GRANT 
OF AUTHORITY FOR THE EXERCISE OF EMINENT DOMAIN TO 
REACH MINERAL DEPOSITS EXCLUDES OIL AND GAS AS NON-
MINERAL SUBSTANCES. 
In plain and unambiguous terms, Section 501(6)(a) confers the power of eminent 
domain for the construction of "roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, 
pipes, and dumping places to facilitate the milling, smelting, or other reduction of ores, or 
the working of mines, quarries, coal mines, or mineral deposits including minerals in 
solution." The only question addressed by the district court and the only question 
relevant to this appeal is whether the leased oil and gas deposits sought to be accessed by 
Marion and the Trust are within the ambit of "mineral deposits including minerals in 
solution" that may be accessed by resort to the powers of eminent domain. 
This Court consistently has held that the term "minerals" includes oil and gas, and 
that definition is supported by other authority, including the definition of "mineral" 
contained in the Trust's Enabling Act. See Utah Code § 53C-1-103(4). The district 
court's judgment excluding oil and gas as non-mineral substances outside the reach of the 
statute constitutes reversible error. 
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1. Over 100 Years of Precedent Demonstrates that the Term "Minerals*' 
Unequivocally includes Oil and Gas Deposits. 
For more than 1 00 years I Itah coi ills consistently have held that the term 
"minerals" includes oil and gas deposits. The district court's Judgment impermissibly 
ignores and repudiates this long-standing authority. 
' In Nephi Plaster & Mfg Co. v. Juab County, 33 Utah 114, 93 P. 53, 54 (Utah 
1907), the court, construed the taxing statute in Utah's 1898 .Revised-Statutes, which read, 
mi ivln aiil fui 1 ''[,i|ll riiinrs .unl inininj; claims, both place r and i: ock in place, 
containing or bearing gold, siivei. ^onnc.". sead, coal or other valuable mineral deposits . . 
restrictively or expansively, and after review of the numerous authorities and cases cited 
therein, 'the court, conch ided: 
We think that it is reasonably clear that the phrase "or other valuable 
mineral deposits," was not intended to contain minerals only ejusdem 
generis with the metals specially named, but that It w as intended that ail " 
mineral deposits should be taxed in this way, and not only the • 
metalliferous minerals and coal 
Ft /. at 57 (emphasis added). 
' rhough the Nephi Plaster decision was limited to "a gypsum deposit, and nothing 
term "mines" was held not to be "limited to mere subterranean excavations or workings," 
nor was the term "minerals" "limited to the metals or metalliferous deposits ' " Id 
nl SK (niiphasis mlrlaJl 
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This Court's expansive definition of "minerals" in Nephi Plaster consistently has 
been reaffirmed and reiterated, and has been utilized to mandate the inclusion of oil and 
gas within the term. In Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham Consol Mining Co., 69 
Utah 423, 255 P. 672, 673 (Utah 1926), this Court considered "a perpetual grant or 
easement to dump ore, rock, and earth, and other material, on the surface of a portion of 
the mining claim of the defendant. . . ." In reviewing a condemnation action, the Utah 
Copper court held that the plaintiff had the right "to avail itself of waters carrying copper 
or other minerals in solution . . . . " Id. at 674. 
The Utah Copper defendants had attempted to rely upon Nephi Plaster, which had 
been "cited to the effect that the term 'mineral' is not limited to metal or metalliferous 
deposits but also includes petroleum and other liquids." Id. at 675 (emphasis added). 
While the court found defendants' reliance on Nephi Plaster unpersuasive, it did so while 
expressly noting that the cited proposition - that the term "mineral" is not limited to 
metal or metalliferous deposits but also includes petroleum and other liquids - was a 
proposition "[t]hat may be conceded." Id. 
The Utah Copper defendants also had cited additional cases "to the effect that oil 
and gas are minerals . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). The court again reiterated that 
defendants' assertion "may be conceded," even though it ultimately failed to support 
defendants' claims. Id. 
The now "conceded" principal that the term "minerals" includes oil and gas was 
reaffirmed in Western Development Company v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 288 P.2d 452 (Utah 
1955), where the court considered conveyance documents that granted and reserved "all 
12 
the coal, gold, silver, lead, copper, and other precious and valuable ores, minerals, mines 
and mining rights." Td. at 453. 
of a deed, usually an old one, where 'minerals' .or 'mineral rights5 have been reserved and"" 
oil. and gas have subsequently been discovered on the land;5' a problem that had not 
previously arisen in Utah but had "been frequently treated in other jurisdictions.5" Id at 
453-54. 
issue was founded upon the fundamental understanding and acknowledgement that the 
term "minerals" included oil and gas: 
Were the only question involved the construction of the first paragraphs of 
both the reservation and the grant in the instant case, we would have no 
trouble applying the majority rule that a reservation of "minerals" retains 
the rights to oil and gas, unless a contrary intention is manifested. 
I <: I at 454 (emphasis added) (<: iting Nephi Pla stt 7 ). 
' The construction of the term, "minerals" was not the only consideration in Western 
Development, however Rather, since the intent of the parties controlled the construction 
of the particular conveyance instrument at issue and "the intention of the parties [could] 
be ascertained from, the instrument," the court elected not to invoke "arbitrary rules of 
was "equivocal" and there was-no proof "by extrinsic evidence that the intention of the 
parties was other 'than to grant what is generally accepted as within the term "minerals,5" 
oil and gas were minerals included in the operative grants and reservations. Id. at 455. • 
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2. The District Court Impermissibly Ignored the Statute's Plain Meaning. 
Despite this 100 year history of this Court's consistent interpretation of the term 
"minerals" to include oil and gas, the district court failed in its mandate to construe 
Section 501(6)(a) by relying on the "plain language of the statute." 
There is no question or doubt but that Section 501(6)(a) allows for the exercise of 
the powers of eminent domain and condemnation in connection with "the milling, 
smelting, or other reduction of ores, or the working of mines, coal mines, or mineral 
deposits, including minerals in solution." The district court should have been guided by 
this Court's direction in Western Development: 
Were the only question involved the construction of the first paragraphs of 
both the reservation and the grant in the instant case, we would have no 
trouble applying the majority rule that a reservation of "minerals" retains 
the rights to oil and gas, unless a contrary intention is manifested. 
288 P.2d at 454 (emphasis added). 
Significantly, unlike this Court in Western Development, the district was not 
required to consider the intent of the parties. Rather, the only mandate to the district 
court was that it apply the unambiguous definition of a term in a statute. In that light, this 
case is directly analogous to and the district court properly should have been guided by 
the Tenth Circuit's holding in Anschutz Land and Livestock Company v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Company, 820 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1987). There, the court, applying Utah law 
and after analyzing Western Development, held that the term "other minerals" "as a 
matter of law" encompassed oil and gas interests and, thus, "[e]xtrinsic evidence of 
intent was . . . inadmissible." Id. at 343 (emphasis added). 
14 
The district court erred by failing to apply the unambiguous definition of 
"minerals" in its interpretation of Section 501(6)(a), Therefore, as a matter of law , the 
Judgment < :annot be sustained. 
3, The Principles of Statutory Construction Relied upon by the District 
Court Cannot Support the Judgment. 
Because the meaning of the term "'minerals" in the context of oil and gas deposits 
ha s long had been decided, as a matter of law, the district court erred by applying 
Section 50 l(6)(a). 
statute should be construed according to its plain language. Thus, where the statutory 
language is plain and una mbiguoiis, we will not look beyond it to divine legislative 
(citations omitted); State v. Ireland 2006 III 17,1 11, 133 P.3d 396 ("[o]nly if we find 
the statutory language to be ambiguous may we turn to secondary principles of statutory 
construction . . . . ; , *ee alsu Juhnson v. Utah State Retirement Bd.3 '770 P.2d 93, 95 
(Utah 1 988) ("A fundamental principle of statutory construction is that unambiguous 
language in il'lic sluliitr MsHI m?n mil h hiivqnvivd Mm JI;, in 'nnlradiU ih plain 
meaning."). 
The cited case is a criminal case but there is no reason to appl> different i i lies c f 
statutory construction to criminal, as opposed to civil, statutes. 
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Thus, in Western Development, this Court rejected defendants' attempted 
application of the principle of ejusdem generis because, in addition to enumerating 
valuable ores ("gold, silver, lead copper and other precious and valuable ores"), "the 
granting clauses included ccoal.'" 288 P.2d at 454. This inclusion was significant 
because, while the listed ores "have the quality of being 'hard' minerals, coal is similar in 
composition and use to oil, being a hydrocarbon." Id. Since it was impossible to 
determine whether the "classification of materials being granted should be approached 
from the view of use, physical characteristics, or value," application of the ejusdem 
generis doctrine was rejected. Id. 
It also is significant that this Court in Nephi Plaster cautioned, with particular 
applicability here: 
The doctrine of ejusdem generis is but a rule of construction ...and is 
intended to aid in ascertaining the meaning of the Legislature, and does not 
warrant a court in confining the operation of a statute within narrower 
limits than intended by the lawmakers. The general object of an act 
sometimes requires that the final general term not be restricted in meaning 
by its more specific predecessors. 
93 P. at 58 (quotation omitted) (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, and more recently in State v. Tanner, 2009 UT App 326, ^16, -P.3d-, 
the court of appeals, considering the interpretation of Utah Code § 76-5-404. l(4)(h), 
concluded the statue was "not ambiguous, and we therefore need not resort to other 
methods of interpretation, such as ejusdem generis." (Footnote omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
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Contrary to this clear authority, the district court erred by improperly utilizing 
principles of statutory construction and other methods of interpretation, such as ejusdem 
Judgment thus must be reversed 
B rHE HISTORY OF UTAH'S CONDEMNATION STATUTE EVIDENCES 
THE STATE'S RIGHT TO CONDEMN FOR ACTIVITIES RELATING TO 
THE EXPLOITATION OF MINERALS AND MINERAL DEPOSITS, 
INCLUDING OIL AND GAS. 
a1hr powu nil cniiim ill ilnnmm r. nnsiduvd ini inalienable pnv\n of «4ate 
sovereignty. Without it, the state cannot be a state." Attorney General Opinion 92-008 
(J iiiie 16, 1992) (quote xtion omitted), 
in recognition oi uus inalienable and necessar\ power, since un. mst 
comprehensive compilation of the State's Code Si: 1R9? u-.c. I egislature expressly has 
author--*'. \ • "in\\ - *v • .' .... .-.. -. • i'« r - - iiiie •". ".".••• -• • sst-d 
Statute Chapter 65, titled Eminent Domain, slated in oerinieni part: 
[Section] 3588, Exercised in behalf of what uses. Subject to the 
' provisions of this chapter, the right of eminent domain may be exercised in 
behalf of the following public uses: 
2. Public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, arid all citlli er 
public uses authorized by the legislature. 
6, Roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, and 
dumping places to facilitate the milling, smelting, or other reduction of 
ores, or the working of mines; outlets, natural or otherwise, for the deposit 
or conduct of tailings, refuse, or water from, mills, smelters or other works 
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for the reduction of ores, or from mines; mill dams; natural gas or oil pipe 
lines, tanks, or reservoirs; 
(Emphasis added). 
Revised Statute Section 3589 additionally provided, "[t]he following is a 
classification of the estates and rights in lands subject to be taken for public use: ... 2. 
An easement, when taken for any other use." A road and pipeline easement to access the 
Leases has always been contemplated by the Utah Legislature. So too has access for oil 
and gas activities. 
Section 1552 in Title 45 of the Revised Statute, titled "Natural Gas,v expressly 
states (emphasis added): 
Right of way for pipe lines. Any person, corporation, or association 
desirous of obtaining the right-of-way for a pipe line or lines, or the 
location of any gas tank or reservoir, shall be entitled to exercise the right 
of eminent domain. 
Moreover, the term "mineral deposits9' has resided in the condemnation statute 
since at least 1909. See Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consol Mining Co., 
174 P. 172, 174-75 (Utah 1918) {quoting Comp. Laws 1907, § 3588, as amended by 
chapter 47 Laws Utah 1909). 
There is and can be no question but that "it was the intention of the legislative 
power of this state to declare mining generally and the development of mines and mineral 
deposits a public use, in furtherance of which the right of the exercise of eminent domain 
was applied with full force and effect." Monetaire Mining, 11A P. at 175. 
The adoption of the Judicial Code, § 78B-6-501, did not alter or affect this long-
standing and well-established precedent. Rather, the Code continues the grant of the 
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power of eminent domain for: "(6) (a) roads, ... [and] pipes, ... to facilitate the ... 
working of mines, quarries, coal mines, or mineral deposits including minerals in 
solution;" as well as for "(d) gas, oil or coal pipelines, tanks or reservoirs." (Emphasis 
added). As did the prior statutes, today's Utah Code § 78B-6-502(2), grants a 
concomitant "easement, when taken for any other use . . . . " 
C. THE TRUST'S ENABLING STATUE DEFINES "MINERAL" TO 
INCLUDE OIL AND GAS AND REQUIRES THE TRUST TO OPTIMIZE 
THE VALUE OF TRUST LANDS AND ASSETS. 
The definition of the term "mineral" has been well-settled both by this Court and 
the legislative history of the condemnation statute. That definition, and the impropriety 
of the district court's failure to apply that definition, is further reinforced by reference to 
the statutes and Constitutional mandates governing the Trust. 
L Utah's Enabling Act Requires the Trust to Generate Proceeds for the 
State's Public Schools and Public Institution - Both Being Public 
Purposes. 
The Trust was founded through the adoption of the School and Institutional Trust 
Lands Management Act for the purpose of "managing] lands that Congress granted to 
the state for the support of the common schools and other beneficiary institutions, under 
the Utah Enabling Act" Utah Code § 53C-1-102. 
The controlling Federal law which is the genesis for the Utah Constitution and 
Code, Utah's Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107 (July 16, 1894), Sections 10 and 12 require: 
Section 10 [School fund.] 
That the proceeds of lands herein granted for educational purposes, 
except as hereinafter otherwise provided, shall constitute a permanent 
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school fund, the interest of which only shall be expended for the 
support of said schools, and such land shall not be subject to 
preemption, homestead entry, or any other entry under the land laws of the 
United States, whether surveyed or unsurveyed, but shall be surveyed for 
school purposes only. 
Section 12 [third proviso, Disposition.] 
[t]he lands granted by this section [for State institutions] shall be held, 
appropriated, and disposed of exclusively for the purposes herein 
mentioned, in such manner as the legislature of the State may provide. 
(Emphasis added). 
With simple clarity, the Trust's Management Act also provides that, for purposes 
of the Act, "'Mineral' includes oil, gas, and hydrocarbons." Utah Code § 53C-1-103(4). 
2. Utah's Constitution and Code Require the Trust to Obtain Optimum 
Value from Trust Lands. 
Article XX, Section 2 of Utah's Constitution, titled "School and Institutional Trust 
Lands" provides that lands granted to the State "are declared to be school and 
institutional trust lands, held in trust by the State for the respective beneficiaries and 
purposes stated in the Enabling Act grants." The Trust is required to "obtain the 
optimum values from use of trust lands and revenues for the trust beneficiaries, including 
the return of not less than fair market value for the use, sale, or exchange of school and 
institutional trust assets . . . ." Utah Code § 53C-l-302(l)(b)(iii). The Trust performed 
that duty by issuing the Leases. See, i.e., Utah Code § 53C-2-401(l)(d)(i) ("Coal and 
mineral deposits in trust lands may be leased on a rental and royalty basis."). Permitting 
the Defendant to deny access to the Trust's oil and gas deposits "would be to contravene 
the important public policy that the State should recover full value from the lease of 
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school trust land." Plateau Min. Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 
720, 729 (Utah 1990). 
D. THE DISTRICT COURT'S INTERPRETATION WOULD PRODUCE AN 
ABSURD AND IRRATIONAL RESULT. 
The present case requires the judicious application of the absurd results doctrine 
because, if left to stand, the district court's interpretation of Section 501(6)(a) would 
effect an irrational result that could not have been intended by the Legislature. 
The district court's interpretation of Section 501(6)(a) was based on a superficial 
reading of the statute without regard to the long-established understanding of the terms 
used by the Legislature in that Section. It is a well-accepted principle of statutory 
construction that "a court should not follow the literal language of a statute if its plain 
meaning works an absurd result." State ex rel Z.C., 2007 UT 54, f 11, 165 P.3d 1206 
{quoting Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, ^ 18, 104 P.3d 1242) (footnote 
omitted). "The absurd results canon of statutory construction recognizes that although 
'the plain language interpretation of a statute enjoys a robust presumption in its favor, it 
is also true that [a legislative body] cannot, in every instance, be counted on to have said 
what it meant or to have meant what it said/'5 Z.C., 2007 UT 54, f 11 {quoting FBI v. 
Abrarnson, 456 U.S. 615, 638 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)). 
The benefits to a statutory construction that avoids absurd results are clear: 
When statutory language plausibly presents the court with two alternative 
readings, we prefer the reading that avoids absurd results. The FAK 
parties' interpretation not only creates an absurd result, it invites confusion, 
piecemeal litigation, a waste of judicial resources, and gamesmanship in the 
payment of claims. 
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Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraerner, LLC, 2009 UT 7, % 73 - P.3d -, (quotations 
omitted). 
As this Court has observed, "the guiding star of the absurd results doctrine is the 
intent of the pertinent legislative body, which limits the application of this canon of 
construction. Rather than controverting legislative power, the absurd resulls doctrine 
functions to preserve legislative intent when it is narrowly applied." Z.C, 2007 UT 54, 
112. 
If the Judgment were allowed to stand, the result would be irrational and absurd in 
at least two distinct manners. First, notwithstanding the mandate issued in the Trust's 
Enabling Act, and as supported by the Utah Constitution, one landowner could 
effectively prevent the Trust from accessing and exploiting its oil and gas deposits for the 
benefit of the Trust and the beneficiaries under the Trust, including the state of Utah's 
schools. 
Second, the district court relied upon the specific inclusion of oil and gas in Utah 
Code Section 78B-6-501(6)(d) for the proposition that "the legislature purposely intended 
to exclude oil and gas from" Section 501(6)(a) (R.000216). Of course, this would give 
parties the power of condemnation to store oil and gas under Section 501(6)(d) but not to 
produce it under 501(6)(a). Surely, the legislature did not intend such an absurd 
contradiction. This Court should not support the district court's interpretation which 
inextricably leads to that absurd result. 
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E. BECAUSE UTAH CODE § 78B-6-501(6)(A) ALLOWS FOR THE 
EXERCISE OF EMINENT DOMAIN TO REACH OIL AND GAS 
DEPOSITS, MARION AND THE TRUST ARE ENTITLED TO 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON THEIR COMPLAINT IN 
CONDEMNATION. 
In addition to opposing the Ranch's Motion to Dismiss, Marion and the Trust also 
moved for partial summary judgment for a determination "that Utah Code § 78B-6-501 
authorizes Plaintiffs to condemn an easement to access Trust oil and gas leases." 
(R.000144) The Judgment denied the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as moot in 
light of the granting of the Ranch's Motion to Dismiss. (R.000216) 
As established above, the Judgment was contrary to established authority and, as a 
matter of law, cannot be sustained. Instead, as a matter of law, the district court should 
have applied the unambiguous definition of "minerals" to Section 501(6)(A). Such an 
application would require a finding that Utah Code § 78B-6-501 authorizes Plaintiffs to 
condemn an easement to access, develop and produce Trust oil and gas leases. As a 
result, as a matter of law, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Marion and 
the Trust should have been granted. 
Accordingly, to effectuate the clear intent of the Legislature, this Court should 
reverse the Judgment, order that the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be granted, 
and remand the matter to the district court for a determination of the proper statutory 
compensation to be paid by Marion to the Ranch for the use of the Easements. 
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X. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Marion and the Trust respectfully request that this 
Court reverse the district court's Judgment, enter judgment for Marion and the Trust, and 
grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Utah Code § 78B-6-501 Eminent Domain - Uses for which right may be exercised. 
2. Utah Code § 53C-1-103(4) Definition of "Mineral" 
3. Utah Revised Statutes dated January 1,1898 
4. Judgment and Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Denying Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment dated September 8, 2009, Case No. 090700027, Seventh 
Judicial District, Carbon County, Utah. 
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ADDENDUM TAB 1 
Westlaw* 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-6-501 Page 1 
CFormerly cited as UT ST § 78-34-1 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
*&1 Chapter 6. Particular Proceedings 
*• Part 5. Eminent Domain (Refs & Annos) 
-• § 78B-6-501. Eminent domain—Uses for which right may be exercised 
Subject to the provisions of this part, the right of eminent domain may be exercised on behalf of the following public 
uses: 
(1) all public uses authorized by the Government of the United States; 
(2) public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all other public uses authorized by the Legislature; 
(3)(a) public buildings and grounds for the use of any county, city, town, or board of education; 
(b) reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes, ditches, or pipes for conducting water for the use of the inhabitants of 
any county, city, or town, or for the draining of any county, city, or town; 
(c) the raising of the banks of streams, removing obstructions from streams, and widening, deepening, or straight-
ening their channels; 
(d) bicycle paths and sidewalks adjacent to paved roads; 
(e) roads, streets, and alleys for public vehicular use, excluding trails, paths, or other ways for walking, hiking, bi-
cycling, equestrian use, or other recreational uses, or whose primary purpose is as a foot path, equestrian trail, bi-
cycle path, or walkway; and 
(f) all other public uses for the benefit of any county, city, or town, or its inhabitants; 
(4) wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads, byroads, plank and turnpike roads, roads for 
transportation by traction engines or road locomotives, roads for logging or lumbering purposes, and railroads and 
street railways for public transportation; 
(5) reservoirs, dams, watergates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, aqueducts and pipes for the supplying of persons, 
mines, mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of ores, with water for domestic or other uses, or for irriga-
tion purposes, or for the draining and reclaiming of lands, or for the floating of logs and lumber on streams not navi-
gable, or for solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution; 
(6)(a) roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, and dumping places to facilitate the milling, smelt-
ing, or other reduction of ores, or the working of mines, quarries, coal mines, or mineral deposits including minerals 
in solution; 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-6-501 Page 2 
(b) outlets, natural or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct of tailings, refuse or water from mills, smelters or other 
works for the reduction of ores, or from mines, quarries, coal mines or mineral deposits including minerals in so-
lution; 
(c) mill dams; 
(d) gas, oil or coal pipelines, tanks or reservoirs, including any subsurface stratum or formation in any land for the 
underground storage of natural gas, and in connection with that, any other interests in property which may be re-
quired to adequately examine, prepare, maintain, and operate underground natural gas storage facilities; 
(e) solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution; and 
(f) any occupancy in common by the owners or possessors of different mines, quarries, coal mines, mineral depos-
its, mills, smelters, or other places for the reduction of ores, or any place for the flow, deposit or conduct of tail-
ings or refuse matter; 
(7) byroads leading from highways to residences and farms; 
(8) telegraph, telephone, electric light and electric power lines, and sites for electric light and power plants; 
(9) sewerage of any city or town, or of any settlement of not less than ten families, or of any public building belong-
ing to the state, or of any college or university; 
(10) canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes for supplying and storing water for the operation 
of machinery for the purpose of generating and transmitting electricity for power, light or heat; 
(11) cemeteries and public parks, except for a park whose primary use is: 
(a) as a trail, path, or other way for walking, hiking, bicycling, or equestrian use; or 
(b) to connect other trails, paths, or other ways for walking, hiking, bicycling, or equestrian use; 
(12) pipe lines for the purpose of conducting any and all liquids connected with the manufacture of beet sugar; and 
(13) sites for mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of ores and necessary to their successful operation, 
including the right to take lands for the discharge and natural distribution of smoke, fumes, and dust, produced by 
the operation of works, provided that the powers granted by this subsection may not be exercised in any county 
where the population exceeds 20,000, or within one mile of the limits of any city or incorporated town nor unless the 
proposed condemner has the right to operate by purchase, option to purchase or easement, at least 75% in value of 
land acreage owned by persons or corporations situated within a radius of four miles from the mill, smelter or other 
works for the reduction of ores; nor beyond the limits of the four-mile radius; nor as to lands covered by contracts, 
easements, or agreements existing between the condemner and the owner of land within the limit and providing for 
the operation of such mill, smelter, or other works for the reduction of ores; nor until an action shall have been 
commenced to restrain the operation of such mill, smelter, or other works for the reduction of ores. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008, c. 3, 6 942. eff. Feb. 7. 2008: Laws 2008, c. 341. § 1. eff. Mav 5. 2008. 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
ADDENDUM TAB 2 
Westlaw. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 53C-1-103 Page 1 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 53C. School and Institutional Trust Lands Management Act 
*Hi Chapter 1. Administration 
*1 Part 1. General Provisions (Refs & Annos) 
-• § 53C-1-103. Definitions 
As used in this title: 
(1) "Administration" means the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration. 
(2) "Board" or "board of trustees" means the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees. 
(3) "Director" or "director of school and institutional trust lands" means the chief executive officer of the School 
and Institutional Trust Lands Administration. 
(4) "Mineral" includes oil, gas, and hydrocarbons. 
(5) "Nominating committee" means the committee that nominates candidates for positions and vacancies on the 
board. 
(6) "Policies" means statements applying to the administration that broadly prescribe a future course of action and 
guiding principles. 
(7) "School and institutional trust lands" or "trust lands" means those properties granted by the United States in the 
Utah Enabling Act to the state in trust, and other lands transferred to the trust, which must be managed for the bene-
fit of: 
(a) the state's public education system; or 
(b) the institutions of the state which are designated by the Utah Enabling Act as beneficiaries of trust lands. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1994, c. 294. § 8: Laws 2005, c. 39. $ 5. eff. March 10. 2005. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
State Grazing Advisory Board, duties, see S 4-20-1.5. 
Trust lands, rights-of-way across state lands, see § 72-5-202. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 53C-1-103, UT ST § 53C-1-103 
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
ADDENDUM TAB 3 
THE 
REVISED STATUTES 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, 
IN FORCE 
JAN. 1,1898. 
Kevised, Annotated, and Published by Authority of the Legislature, 
BY 
RICHARD W. YOUNG, 
GRANT H. SMITH, 
WILLIAM A. LEE, 
Code Commissioners. 
TOGETHER WITH THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF TJTAH, THE ENABLING ACT, AND 
THE NATURALIZATION LAWS. 
NATURAL GAS. 395 
may file a petition therefor in the district court of the county where located, 
setting forth: 
1. The cause for which the change of name is sought. 
2. The name proposed. 
3. If the petitioner is a person, that he has been a bona fide citizen of the 
county for the year immediately prior to the filing of the petition; or, if the peti-
tioner is a city, town, precinct, or school district, that two-thirds of the legal 
voters thereof desire such change of name, and that there is no other city, town
 v 
precinct, or school district, in this state, of the name sought. [0. L. §§ 222*, 
3861-2*. 
1546. Hea r ing . Proof of publ ica t ion . Order . At any subsequent 
term, the district court may order the change of name as requested, upon proof 
in open court of the allegations of the petition, and that there exists proper cause 
for granting the same, and that thirty days' previous notice of the hearings 
thereof has been given in a newspaper published or having a general circulation 
in the county. [0. L. §§ 223*; 3862-4. 
1547. Effect of change . Such proceedings shall in no manner affect a 
legal action or proceeding then, pending, nor any right, title, or interest what-
soever. 
TITLE 45. 
NATUEAL GAS. 
1548. Confining g a s in u n u s e d wel l . Any person or corporation in 
possession as owner, lessee, agent, or manager, of any well in which natural gas 
has been found, shall, unless said gas is being utilized, within three months from 
the completion of said well, or at any time upon ceasing to use such well, con-
fine the gas in said well until such time as it shall be utilized; provided, that 
jbhis section shall not apply to any well operated as an oil well. ['92, p. 41. 
1549. P lugg ing abandoned well . Upon abandoning or ceasing t a 
operate any well sunk in exploring for gas, the person or corporation that sunk 
the same shall fill up the well with sand or rock sediment to a depth of at least 
twenty feet above the gas-bearing rock, and drive a round, seasoned wooden 
plug, at least three feet in length, equal in diameter to the diameter o t the well 
below the casing, to a point at least five feet below the bottom of the casing; and 
immediately after drawing the casing, shall drive a round, seasoned wooden 
Jlug, to a point just below where the lower end of the casing rested, which plug 
•shall be at least three feet in length, tapering in form, and of the same diameter 
at the distance of eighteen inches from the smaller end as the diameter of the 
hole below the point at which it is to be driven. After the plug has been pro-
perly driven there shall be filled on the top of the same, sand or rock sediment 
to a depth of at least five feet; provided, thajb in case such geological formation 
shall be encountered in the bore as to make some other method more effective 
for preventing flooding by water from superposed strata, the inspector may direct 
what other plan shall be pursued without unreasonable cost to the owner or 
lessee of the well. ['92, pp. 41-2. 
1550. P e n a l t i e s for neglect . Any person or corporation who shall 
violate any of the provisions of sectionsfif teen hundred and forty-eight a.nd fifteen 
hundred and forty-nine, shall be liable to a penalty of two hundred dollars for each 
and every violation thereof, and to the further penalty of two hundred dollars for 
each thirty days during which such violation shall continue; and all such penal-
, . ^~w v/x ouio, in a civil action or actions, in the name 
of the state for the use of the county in which the well shall have been or>en«vi 
['92, p. 42. y m' 
1 5 5 1 . R igh t s of ad jacen t owner . Whenever any person or corpora-
tion shall abandon any gas well, and shall fail to comply with section fiftee" 
hundred and forty-nine, any person or corporation lawfully in possession of land* 
adjacent to or in the neighborhood of said well may enter upon the land UT)OIS 
which said well is situated and take possession of said well, and plug the sam 
in the manner provided by section fifteen hundred and forty-nine, and may main-
tain a civil action in any court of the state, against all or any of the owners or 
persons abandoning said well, to recover the costs thereof. This shall be in addi-
tion to the penalties provided by section fifteen hundred and fifty. [J92, p. 42 
1552. R igh t of w a y for p ipe l ines. Any person, corporation, or asso-
ciation desirous of obtaining the right of way for a pipe line or lines, or for the 
location of any gas tank or reservoir, shall be entitled to exercise the right of 
eminent domain. ['92, p. 42. 
Eminent domain generally, \\ 3588-3608. 
TITLE 46. 
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. 
CHAPTER 1. 
DEFINITIONS. 
1553. Written promise for sum certain. A negotiable instrument 
is a written promise or request for the payment of a certain sum of money to order 
or bearer, in conformity to the provisions of this title. [C. L. § 2841. 
Cal. Civ. C. § 3087. undertake to pay an attorney's fee if a suit should 
Notes, bills, checks, etc., may be made or drawn be brought to enforce the collection of a note, does 
by telegraph, § 2699. not render the note non-negotiable. Id. A note 
Provision in a note that "if the interest be not falling due in the hands of the payee ceases to be 
paid as stipulated, the legal holder may declare negotiable. Afterwards indorsers take it subject 
the principal due and proceed by law to recover to the same defense that could have been made in 
both principal and interest," does not destroy nego- the hands of the payee. The stipulation to pay 
tiability. Smith v. Williamson, 8 U. 219; 30 P. 753. attorney's fees in case of suit, binds the maker to 
The stipulation in a note which includes the cov- pay them as a part of the costs of the remedy, but 
enants of a mortgage by which the makers agree to he cannot be required to pay more than the fees 
pay taxes on the property, assessment, insurance, actually charged. Id. 
and damages for waste, renders the notenon-nego- Decisions on consideration, § 1567; on suretyship, 
tiable. Salisbury v. Stewait, — IT. —\ 49 P. 777. etc , # 1568; on notes geneially, # 1658. 
The fact that the makers of a promissory note 
1554. Payable in money only. Conditions. A negotiable instru-
ment must be made payable in money only, and without any condition not 
certain of fulfillment. [6. L. § 2842. 
Cal. Civ. C. I 3088. 
1555 . Payee to be a sce r t a inab le . The person to whose order a nego-
tiable instrument is made payable must be ascertainable at the time the instrument 
is made. [C. L. § 2843. 
Cal. Civ. C. I 3089. 
1556. "When payee h a s option. A negotiable instrument may give to 
the payee an option between the payment of the sum specified therein and the 
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its full amount, and for the possession of the premises. In all other cases the 
judgment may be enforced immediately. [C. L. §§ 3801, 3802*. 
Cal. C. Civ. P. 11174*. tiff in a case for damages for forcible entry or un. 
Treble damages for forcible entry, etc., # 3510. lawful detainer is entitled to recover treble daaT 
Under sections 3787 and 3S01, C. L. 1888, a plain- ages. Eecles v, U. P. Coal Co., —- U. —; 48 P. 143' 
3 5 8 5 . P l e a d i n g s verified. The complaint and answer must be verified 
[C. L. § 3802. 
Cal. C. Civ. P. § 1175. 
3586 . A p p e a l w i t h i n t en days . U n d e r t a k i n g . S tay . Either party 
may, within ten days, appeal from the judgment rendered. But an appeal by 
the defendant shall not stay the execution of the judgment, unless, within said 
ten days, he shall execute and file with the court or justice his undertaking to the 
plaintiff, with two or more sureties, in an amount to be fixed by the court or 
justice, but which shall not be less than twice the amount of the judgment 
and costs, to the eiiect that, if the judgment appealed from be affirmed or the 
appeal be dismissed, the appellant will pay the judgment and the costs of appeal 
the value of the use and occupation of the property, and damages justly accruing 
to the plaintiff during the pendency of the appeal. Upon taking the appeal and 
filing the undertaking, all further proceedings in the case shall be stayed. [C, 
L. § 3660*. 
Cal. C. Civ. P. I 978*. 
3 5 8 7 . Civil p rocedu re app l i cab le . The provisions of this code, 
relative to civil actions, appeals, and new trials, so far as they are not inconsist-
ent with the provisions of this chapter apply to the proceedings mentioned in this 
chapter. [C. L. § 3804. 
Cal. C. Civ. P. § 1177* 
CHAPTER 65. 
EMINENT DOMAIN. 
3 5 8 8 . Exerc i sed in beha l f of w h a t uses . Subject to the provisions 
of this chapter, the right of eminent domain maybe exercised in behalf of the fol-
lowing public uses: 
1. All public uses authorized by the government of the United States. 
2. Public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all other pub-
lic uses authorized by the legislature. 
3. Public buildings and grounds for the use of any county, incorporated 
city or town, or school district; reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes, ditches, or 
pipes for conducting water for the use of the inhabitants of any county, or incorpo-
rated city or town, or for draining any county, or incorporated city or town; for 
raising the banks of streams, removing obstructions therefrom, and widening, 
deepening, or straightening their channels; for roads, streets, and alleys, and all 
other public uses for the benefit of any county, incorporated city or town, or the 
inhabitants thereof. 
4. Wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads, by-
roads, plank and turnpike roads, roads for transportation by traction engines or 
road locomotives, roatls for logging or lumbering purposes, and railroads and street 
railways for public transportation. 
5. Eeservoirs, dams, water-gates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, aque-
ducts, and pipes for supplying persons, mines, mills, smelters, or other works for 
the reduction of ores, with water for domestic or other uses, or for irrigating pur-
poses, or for draining and reclaiming lands, or for floating logs and lumber on 
streams not navigable. 
6. Roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, and dump-
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ing places to facilitate the milling, smelting, or other reduction of ores, or the 
working of mines; outlets, natural or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct of 
tailings, refuse, or water from mills, smelters, or other works for the reduction 
of ores, or from mines; mill dams; natural gas or oil pipe lines, tanks, or reser-
voirs; also an occupancy in common by the owners or possessors of different 
mines, mills, smelters, or other places for the reduction of ores, of any place for 
the flow, deposit, or conduct of tailings or refuse matter. 
7. By-roads leading from highways to residences and farms. 
8. Telegraph, telephone, electric light, and electric power lines. 
9. Sewerage of any city or town, or of any settlement of not less than ten 
families, or of any public building belonging to the state, or of any college or 
university. 
10. Canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes for sup-
plying and storing water for the operation of machinery for the purpose of 
generating and transmitting electricity for power, light, or heat. 
11. Cemeteries or public parks. [C. L. § 3841*; ?90, p. 37; '92, pp. 42, 92 ; 
'96, p. 316. 
Cal. C. Civ. P. 11238*. See Sup. '93, p. 995, and Under section 3841, C. L. 1888, providing that 
Sup. '95, p. 33, # 1233*. the right of eminent domain may he exercised in 
Eminent domain for pipes, tanks, etc., for nat- hehalf of steam and horse railroads; held, that by 
ural gas, # 1552; for right of way for canals, ditches, implication this right may be exercised in hehalf 
etc., 2 1277; f o r railroads, § 436; for drainage dis- of electrical railways. Ogden City Eailway Com-
trict, I 773. pany v. Ogden City, 7 U. 207; 26 P. 288. 
3 5 8 9 . E s t a t e s a n d r i g h t s sub jec t t o c o n d e m n a t i o n . The following 
is a classification of the estates and rights in lands subject to be taken for public 
use; 
1. A fee simple, when taken for public buildings or grounds, or for perma-
nent buildings, for reservoirs and dams, and permanent flooding occasioned thereby, 
or for an outlet for a flow, or a place for the deposit of debris or tailings of a 
mine, mill, smelter, or other place for the reduction of ores. 
2. An easement, when taken for any other use. 
3. The right of entry upon, and occupation of, lands, and the right to take 
therefrom such earth, gravel, stones, trees, and timber as may be necessary for 
some public use. [C. L. § 3842*. 
Cal. C. Civ. P, I 1239*. 
3 5 9 0 . P r o p e r t y subject t o c o n d e m n a t i o n . The private property 
which may be taken under this chapter includes: 
1. All real property belonging to any person. 
2. Lands belonging to the state, or to any county, or incorporated city or 
town, not appropriated to some public use. 
3. Property appropriated to public use; provided, that such property shall 
not be taken unless for a more necessary public use than that to which it has been 
already appropriated. 
4. Franchises for toll roads, toll bridges, ferries, and all other franchises; 
provided, that such franchises shall not be taken unless for free highways, railroads, 
or other more necessary public use. 
5. All rights of way for any and all purposes mentioned in section thirty-
five hundred and eighty-eight, and any and all structures and improvements 
thereon, and the lands held or used in connection therewith, shall be subject to 
be connected with, crossed, or intersected by any other right of way or improve-
ment or structure thereon. They shall also be subject to a limited use in common 
with the owner thereof, when necessary; but such uses of crossings, intersections, 
And connections shall be made in the manner most compatible with the greatest 
public benefit and the least private injury. 
6. All classes of private property not enumerated may be taken for public 
use when such taking is authorized by law. [C. L. § 3843. 
Cal. C. Civ. P. I 1240* 
Property and franchises of private corporations subject to eminent domain, Con, art. 12, sec* 11. 
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3591. Conditions precedent to condemnation. Befoi e property can 
be taken it must appear: 
1. That the use to which it is to be applied is a iibe authorized by law. 
2. That the taking is necessary to such use. 
3. If already appropriated to some public use, that the public use to which 
it is to be applied is a more necessary public use. [C. L. § 3844. 
Cal. C. Civ P. I 1241 
3 5 9 2 . R i g h t t o en te r to m a k e survey , e tc . D a m a g e . In all cases 
where land is requiied for public use, the person or corporation or his or its agents 
in charge of such use, may survey and locate the same; but it must be located in 
the manner which will be most compatible with the greatevSt public good and the 
least private injury, and subject to the provisions of this chapter. The person 
or corporation or his or its agents in charge of such public use, may enter upon 
the land and make examinations, surveys, and maps thereof, and such entry shall 
constitute no cause of action in favor of the owners of the lands, except for 
injuries resulting from negligence, wantonness, or malice. [C. L. § 3845. 
Cal. C. Civ. P. k 1242* 
3 5 9 3 . Ju r i sd ic t ion in d i s t r i c t cour t . C o m p l a i n t verified. All 
proceedings under this chapter must be brought in the district court for the 
county in which the property or some part thereof is situated. The complaint in 
such cases must be veiified. [C. L. § 3846*. 
Cal. C Civ P. \ 1243* 
3 5 9 4 . Con ten t s of compla in t . The complaint must contain: 
1. The name of the corporation, association, commission, or person in charge 
of the public use for which the property is sought, who must be styled plaintiff. 
2. The names of all owneis and claimants of the property, ii known, or a 
statement that they are unknown, who must be styled defendants. 
3. A statement of the right of the plaintiff. 
4. If a right of way be sought, the complaint must show the location, gen-
eral route, and termini, and must be accompanied with a map thereof, so far as 
the same is involved in the action or proceeding. 
5. A description of each piece of land sought to be taken, and whether the 
same includes the whole or only part of an entire parcel or tract. All parcels 
lying in the county and required for the same public use may be included in the 
same or separate proceedings, at the option of the plaintiff, but the court may 
consolidate or separate them to suit the convenience of parties. [0. L. § 3847. 
Cal. C Civ. P. \ 1244*. debtednessare "owners" hereunder. O S L and 
SXJBDV. 2. Giantors in trust deed to secure m- U. N. Ey. Co. v Mitchell, 7 U. 5(X\ 27 P 693 
3 5 9 5 . All p a r t i e s in i n t e r e s t m a y a p p e a r . All persons in occupation 
of, or having or claiming an interest in, any of the property described in the 
complaint, or in the damages for the taking thereof, though not named, may 
appear, plead, and defend, each in respect to his own property or interest, or 
that claimed by him, in like manner as if named in the complaint. [C. L». § 3849. 
Oal. C. Civ. P. 11246. 
3 5 9 6 . P o w e r of t h e cour t . The court or judge thereof shall have 
power: 
1. To determine the conditions specified in section thirty-live hundred and 
ninety-one; to determine the places of making connections and crossings, and to 
regulate the manner thereof and of enjoying the common use mentioned in the 
fifth subdivision of section thirty-five hundred and ninety. 
2. To hear and determine all adverse or conflicting claims to the property 
sought to be condemned, and to the damages therefor. 
3. To determine the respective rights of different parties seeking condem-
nation of the same property. [C. L. § 3850. 
Cal. C Civ P. § 1247* 
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3597. Occupancy of premises pending action. Notice. Hear-
'nff Bond. Restraining order. The plaintiff may move the court or a 
*udge thereof, at any time after the commencement of suit, on notice to the defend-
^nt if n e *s a resident of the county, or has appeared in the action, otherwise by 
serving a notice directed to him on the clerk of the court, for an order permitting 
the plaintiff to occupy the premises sought to be condemned, pending the action, 
«md to do such work thereon as may be required for the easement sought, accord-
ing to its nature. The court or a judge thereof shall take proof by affidavit or 
otherwise, of the value of the premises sought to be condemned and of the dam-
ages which will accrue from the condemnation, and of the reasons for requiring a 
speedy occupation, and shall grant or refuse the motion according to the equity 
of the case and the relative damages which may accrue to the parties. If the 
motion is granted, the court or judge shall require the plaintiff to execute and 
file in court a bond to the defendant, with sureties to be approved by the court or 
judge, in a penal sum to be fixed by the court or judge, not less than double the 
value of the premises sought to be condemned and the damages which will ensue 
from condemnation, as the same may appear to the court or judge on the hearing, 
and conditioned to pay the adjudged value of the premises and all damages in 
case the property is condemned, and to pay all damages arising from occupation 
before judgment in case the premises are not condemned, and all costs adjudged 
to the defendant in the action. The sureties shall justify before the court or 
judge after a reasonable notice to the defendant of the time and place of justifica-
tion. The amounts fixed shall be for the purposes of the motion only, and shall 
not be admissible in evidence on final hearing. The court or judge may also, 
pending the action, restrain the defendant from hindering or interfering with the 
occupation of the premises and the doing thereon of the work required for the 
easement. ['92, pp. 2-3*. 
3598. D a m a g e s , h o w assessed. The court, jury, commissioners, or 
referee must hear such legal testimony as may be offered by any of the parties 
to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess: 
1. The value of the property sought to be condemned and all improvements 
thereon pertaining to the realty, and of each and every separate estate or interest 
therein; if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and of each 
estate or interest therein shall be separately assessed. 
2. If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a large 
parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned, 
by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and the 
construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff. 
3. If the property, though no part thereof is taken, will be damaged by the 
construction of the proposed improvement, the amount of such damages. 
4. Separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and each 
estate or interest therein, will be benefited, if at all, by the construction of the 
improvement proposed by the plaintiff; and if the benefit shall be equal to 
the damages assessed, under subdivision two of this section, the owner of the 
parcel shall be allowed no compensation except the value of the portion taken ; 
but if the benefit shall be less than the damages so assessed, the former shall be 
deducted from the latter, and the remainder shall be the only damages allowed 
in addition to the value of the portion taken. 
5. If the property sought to be condemned be for a railroad, the cost of 
good and sufficient fences along the line of such railroad between such railroad 
and other adjoining lands of the defendant; and the cost of cattle guards where 
fences may cross the line of such railroad. 
6. As far as practicable, compensation must be assessed for each source of 
damages separately. [C. L. § 3851*. 
Cal C. Oiv. P. $ 1248*. Where receiver built over unoccupied public 
Private propeity shall not be taken or damaged land to which a party afterward acquires title, he 
for public use without just compensation, Con art. cannot recover as damages the value of the rail-
1, sec. 22. 
798 CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
road's improvements Denver & R. Or W. Ky. Co eminent domain, if lie should not consent to such 
v. Stancliff, 4 U 117; 7 P 530. use of it, lie cannot recover <is damages the value 
Wheic land taken in good faith for the election of such school house. Chase v Junmctt, 8 Tj. 231-
of a schoolhouso, the owner not being known, but 30 P. 757. * ' 
with intention to acquire title by pioceedings in 
3 5 9 9 . D a m a g e s deemed acc rued a t d a t e of service . For the pur-
pose of assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to 
have accrued at the date of the service of summons, and its actual value at that 
date shall be the measure of compensation for all property to be actually taken 
and the basis of damages to property not actually taken, but injuriously affected' 
in all cases where such damages are allowed, as provided in the last section. KQ 
improvements put upon the property subsequent to the date of service of sum-
mons, shall be included in the assessment of compensation or damages. [0. L 
§ 3852. 
Oil. C. Civ. P. i 1249 . 
3 6 0 0 . Act ion b e g u n a n e w w h e r e defendant ' s t i t l e defective. If 
the title attempted to be acquired is found to be defective from any cause, the 
plaintiff may again institute proceedings to acquire the same as in this chapter 
prescribed. [C. L. § 3853. 
Cal C Civ P f 12"30 
3 6 0 1 . D a m a g e s t o be p a i d w i t h i n t h i r t y days . Bond for ra i l road 
fence. The plaintiff must, within thirty days after final judgment, pay the sum 
of money assessed; and, it the plaintiff is a railroad company, it shall also exe-
cute to the defendant a bond, with sureties, to be determined and approved by 
the court or judge, conditioned that the plaintiff shall build proper fences within 
six months from the time the railroad is built on or over the land taken. In an 
action on the bond all damages sustained and the cost of the construction of such 
fences may be reco\ered. [C. L. § 3854-K 
(\il. C. Civ P f V2rA ' 
3 6 0 2 . Id. To w h o m paid . E x e c u t i o n if n o t pa id . Annul l ing 
p roceed ings . Payment may bo made to the defendants entitled thereto, or the 
money may be deposited in court for the defendants and be distributed to those 
entitled uhereto. If the money be not so paid or deposited, the defendants may 
have execution as in civil cases; and if the money cannot be made on execution, 
the court upon a showing to that effect, must set aside and annul the entire pro-
ceedings, and restore possession of the property to the defendants if possession 
has been taken by the plaintiff. [C. L. § 3855. 
Cal. C. Civ. P. $ 1252 
3 6 0 3 . F i n a l o rder m a d e u p o n p a y m e n t . Record ing s a m e . When 
payments have been made (and the bond given, if the plaintiff elects to give one), 
as required by the last two sections, the court must make a final order of con-
demnation, which must describe the property condemned and the purpose of such 
condemnation. A copy of the order must be filed in the office of the recorder of 
the county, and thereupon the property described therein shall vest in the 
plaintiff for the purpose therein specified. [0. L. § 3856. 
Cal C Civ P. ? 1253 
3 6 0 4 . Au tho r i z ing o c c u p a n c y b y plaintiff. Deposi t . Paymen t . 
Effect. At any time after the entry of judgment, or pending an appeal from 
the judgment to the supieme court, whenever the plaintiff shall have paid into 
court for the defendant the full amount of the judgment, and such further sum 
as may be required by the court as a fund to pay any further damages and costs 
that may be recovered in said proceedings, as well as all damages that may be 
sustained by the defendant, if for any cause the property shall not be finally 
taken for public use, the district court in which the proceeding was tried 
may, upon notice of not less than ten days, authorize the plaintiff, if alieady in 
possession, to continue therein, and if not, then to take possession of and use the 
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property during the pendency of and until the final conclusion of the litigation, 
and may, if necessary, stay all actions and proceedings against the plaintiff on 
account thereof. The defendant, who is entitled to the money paid into court 
for him upon any judgment, shall be entitled to demand and receive the same 
at any time thereafter upon obtaining an order therefor from the court. I t shall 
be the duty of the court or a judge thereof, upon application being made by such 
defendant, to order and direct that the money so paid into court for him be 
delivered to him upon his filing a satisfaction of the judgment, or upon his filing 
a receipt therefor, and an abandonment of all defenses to the action or proceeding, 
except as to the amount of damages that he may be entitled to in the event that 
a new trial shall be granted. A payment to a defendant, as aforesaid, shall be 
held to be an abandonment by such defendant of all defenses interposed by him, 
excepting his claim for greater compensation. [C. L. § 3857. 
Cal. C. Civ. P. \ 1254*. 
3605 . Apportionment of costs. Costs may be allowed or not, and if 
allowed, may be apportioned between the parties on the same or adverse sides, in 
the discretion of the court. [C. L. § 3858. 
Cal. C. Civ. P. 11255. 
3606 . Procedure applicable. Except as otherwise provided in this 
chapter, the provisions of this code relative to civil actions, new trials, and appeals, 
shall be applicable to and constitute the rules of practice in the proceedings in this 
chapter. [C. L. § 3859. 
Cal. C. Civ. P. \ 125r. 
3607 . Rights of cit ies and t o w n s not affected. Nothing in this code 
must be construed to abrogate or repeal any statute providing for the taking of 
property in any city or town for street purposes. [C. L. § 3860. 
Cal. C. Civ. P. ? 1263. 
3608. Crossings to be made and kept in repair. A party obtaining 
a right of way shall, without delay, construct such crossings as may be required 
by the court or judge, and shall keep them and the way itself in good repair. 
['90, pp. 39, 40*. 
CHAPTER 66. 
QUO WARRANTO 
3609. Action in name of state, against whom. A civil action may 
be brought in the name of the state: 
1. Against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exer-
cises, a public office, civil or military, or a franchise, within this state, or an office 
in a corporation created by the authority of this state. 
2. Against a public officer, civil or military, who does or suffers an act 
which, by the provisions of law, works a forfeiture of his office. 
3. Against an association of persons who act as a corporation within this 
state without being legally incorporated. [C. L. § 3529*. 
Mont. Civ. P. $ 1410. Cal. C. Civ. P. ? 803*. 
Oiiginal jurisdiction in supreme and in district couits, Con art. 8, sees. 4, 7. 
3 6 1 0 . Id. Against a corporation. A like action may be brought 
against a corporation: 
1. When it has offended against a provision of an act by or nnder which it 
was created, altered, or renewed, or any act altering or amending snch acts. 
2. When it has forfeited its privileges and franchises by non-user. 
3. When it has committed or omitted an act which amounts to a surrender 
or a forfeiture of its corporate rights, privileges, and franchises. 
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Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
Samantha J. Slark (#10774) 
50 West Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2035 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARION ENERGY, INC., a Texas 
corporation; and STATE OF UTAH 
SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST 
LANDS ADMINISTRATION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KFJ RANCH PARTNERSHIP, a business 
association of unknown type, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 090700027 
Judge George M. Harmond 
Defendant KFJ Ranch Partnership's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs* Motion for 
Summary Judgment came on for hearing before the Court on August 5, 2009. Defendant KFJ 
Ranch Partnership was represented by Thomas R. Karrenberg and Samantha J. Slark of 
Anderson & Karrenberg. Plaintiff Marion Energy, Inc. ("Marion") was represented by Jack R. 
Luellen and Matthew L. Crockett of Beatty & Wozniak, P.C. and the State of Utah School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Administration ("SITLA") was represented by Thomas A. Mitchell. 
00(1215 
The Court, having carefully reviewed and considered the various pleadings and papers 
submitted by the parties with respect to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment, hereby enters the following order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 
is denied. Plaintiffs' condemnation action is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The operative 
facts of this case are not in dispute. Plaintiffs brought this condemnation action to take two 
permanent easements over Defendant's private property for the purpose of building roads to 
access and develop their SITLA oil and gas leases. 
Utah Code Aon. § 78B-6-501(6)(a) does not provide authority to take land for roads to 
access oil and gas deposits. In interpreting the intent of the legislature, the Court is required to 
consider the plain language of the statute, to consider that each word has been used advisedly, 
and to presume any omissions are purposeful. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-501(6)(a) lists the 
substances for which land can be condemned for roads, and oil and gas are not included. 
Furthermore, oil and gas are specifically mentioned in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6~501(6)(d), 
which shows the legislature purposefully intended to exclude oil and gas from Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-6~501(6)(a). Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted, Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment is denied, and the condemnation action is dismissed with prejudice. 
2 
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DATED this _ j j _ day of >^\C~J&SK, 2009. 
Approved as toj^ l 
Jack R. Luellen 
Matthew L. Crockett 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Marion 
Approved as to form 
BY THE COURT: 
l/U,^m¥a^ 
George M." Harmond ^~ 
W t Judge 
Thomas A. Mitchell 
Attorneys for Plaintiff SITLA 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of August, 2009, I did cause a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT to be served via first-class mail, postage prepaid, upon the following: 
Jack R. Luellen 
Matthew L. Crockett 
Beatty & Wozniak, PC 
216 16th Sheet, Suite 100 
Denver, CO 80202 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Marion Energy, Inc. 
Thomas A. Mitchell 
675 East 500 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Utah School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Administration 
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